Suppose a person performs a service which corrects a fundamental
defect in an existing, fairly large Federal program scheduled for
termination. What accounting method would be used to compute proper
compensation and status for such a service, and how would at least
three professionals in the Washington, DC area capable of applying
that method for a fee be found? Assume two cases: person performing
the service is (Case 1) a consultant or (Case 2) to be hired
permanently. The archetype here is Pied Piper, and the goal is to
bring about a happier ending. Assume this problem is real as stated. |
Request for Question Clarification by
mathtalk-ga
on
05 Jan 2003 19:03 PST
Hi, zylo-ga:
The subject says "Compensation estimate", so I will assume that the
focus is on an appropriate means to determine compensation and
"status" (job classification) for the person who "performs a service
which corrects a fundamental defect in an existing, fairly large
Federal program".
But the accounting for this cost and the means to determine an
appropriate contract schedule or salary will depend on who is paying
for the service. You are not quite clear about who is undertaking the
correction of the "fundamental defect". Perhaps you meant to imply
that it would be the Federal government which procures these services.
That would put a lot of structure around the terms of any contract or
employment opening. Please clarify for us who will be paying for this
service.
Another curious ambiguity is the phrase "scheduled for termination".
A plain reading would apply this to the "fairly large Federal
program", but that would cast doubt on the interpretation that the
Federal government is committed to remediating a defect in the
program. Alternative readings might be the termination of the defect
rather than the program, or even that the one who "performs a service"
is scheduled for termination.
You mention the "archetype" is Pied Piper, a case in which a municipal
government contracted for removal of a nuisance. Since you are
speaking of the Washington, DC area, I can readily imagine a project
in which similar elements might realistically be posited, e.g.
contamination of groundwater in the Southeast of Corps of Engineers
activities. But as much fun as guessing is, I fear that it does you
little good. Explain the "stakeholders" and their roles a little
better, and I'm sure that either I or another qualified researcher
will be happy to help.
regards, mathtalk-ga
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Clarification of Question by
zylo-ga
on
05 Jan 2003 20:25 PST
1) Work is performed for the Federal agency. It concerns engineering
and program management.
2) The program is scheduled for termination unless its basic
engineering improves. The task of implementing its goal would be
given to another agency.
3) The Pied Piper archetype is to be read here as an unresolved
compensation dispute between an individual and a government, caused by
a poor prior agreement, poor because there was no informal agreement
and the formal agreement could not be enforced. The City Fathers
thought the Piper's offer a joke, and overbid, then refused payment.
The result was bad for everybody. Perhaps a better outcome in similar
situations is possible today. How?
4) Players are two: (a) the person to perform the task and (b) the
head of the agency in question. The objective is enforceable equity.
Justice, if you will, and a good working relation to boot. How to get
the work done, make the person happy, and make the head of the
agency's supporting staff happy? Perhaps there are generally accepted
rules for determining compensation in such cases. What are they like?
Who would know them?
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Request for Question Clarification by
mathtalk-ga
on
06 Jan 2003 19:37 PST
Hi, zylo-ga:
Thanks for the clarification. I believe I can help you find some
appropriate resources, but it would help to know exactly what you
meant by saying there was a formal agreement, but it is unenforceable.
Was this a written agreement? Why is it unenforceable?
My impression is that the focus of your question is on finding what
would essentially be expert witnesses, in the sense of being able to
place a monetary value on services that have been rendered in the past
and might be rendered on an ongoing basis if a "politically palatable"
solution can be put together. In addition you have implicitly asked
for suggestions on how that solution might be structured, a process
question.
Please correct these impressions if I have not rightly understood your
concern.
regards, mathtalk-ga
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Clarification of Question by
zylo-ga
on
07 Jan 2003 10:51 PST
The unenforceable formal agreement was in the archetype, and remains
only a possibility in real life. As you know, contracts are supposed
to mirror actual agreements. Sometimes there is no "meeting of the
minds," but a contract is still drafted and signed. Typically such
contracts are very difficult or impossible to enforce; sometimes
courts rule them invalid. It is not unusual for one or both sides to
believe treachery and ill intent were involved when such contracts
fail, even when neither is involved. The Pied Piper fable is an
archetype, a myth, describing failed contracts involving government as
one of the participants. It is in this case a description of what is
to be avoided, not a description of what has happened. Such
archetypes are useful in discussing issues without involving real
entities, and here I am putting one to such use.
The goal proposed is to achieve a meeting of the minds, or at least a
meeting of procedures, on the subject of compensation. To continue
using the fable as an illustration, perhaps the funds promised as
payment to the Piper could have been put into escrow before services
were delivered, perhaps coupled with a performance bond, in order to
show good faith on both sides. Presumably, faced with the immediate
necessity of putting money into escrow, the governmental entity would
have taken the matter a bit more seriously, and the two sides could
have come to a real agreement.
Now, on to actual entities.
Your assumption is correct. I have, in the past, rendered services
that could have avoided losses and led to gains that would have been
considerable, even by the standards of the agency in question. The
agency involved agrees in writing that this is the case. Compensation
was not comensurate with the losses that could have been avoided, but,
in fact, my services (analyses) were disregarded, not applied, and the
losses were not avoided. I consider the lost income as the sunk cost
of a sales demonstration, and am interested in, as you say, an ongoing
relation with the agency.
However, this immediately brings up the subject of status and
compensation. The agency clearly operates within a well defined
framework of constraints, and the subject of status and compensation
must thus be initiated and developed within this framework, in a
"politically palatable" way as you say. This is especially important
in that, as you know, contemporary organizations are often masters at
the art of repudiating agreements informally when they want to do
that.
The primary focus of my question is determining compensation
(including status) in such a way that the agency does not try to
repudiate the agreement, formally or otherwise, at a later date,
provided that promised services are delivered. At the same time, I
need a proper return on my time, effort, and costs, which have been
substantial. Absent that, I cannot proceed. Since the organization
involved is governmental, appeal to established practice seems to me
to be a promising line of approach.
I do not believe I understand the term "expert witness" as you use it
here, but if it means a person capable of understanding and resolving
the primary focus of my question (as described in the preceding
paragraph), than locating several prospective expert witnesses would
be a satisfactory answer to the question, if coupled with citation of
a survey work or other entry into the literature of the subject.
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Clarification of Question by
zylo-ga
on
09 Jan 2003 09:03 PST
Detailed requirements are not unusual for patronage jobs. While
perhaps well intended back in the 1890s, when detailed requirements
were first passed as civil service laws, they have become a way of
preventing competitive bidding between politicians for support through
salary level. In short, potential political sponsors can't buy
support through offering higher salaries, and the bidding process has
shifted to sheer bulk and duration of jobs provided. Reardon's book
on George Washington Plunkett tells quite a bit about how early civil
service laws were seen by Tammany Hall professionals in the words of
very well qualified representative of that organization. Civil service
terrified them, and for good reason: civil service eliminated personal
contact between government and governed, putting a bureaucracy in
between. That is, it eliminated the Tammany Hall professionals.
Subsequent use of these laws by FDR did in fact lead to the end of
Tammany and the institution of contemporary government. Essentially,
the bureaucracy was not only a substantial source of patronage in
itself, it was also way of dispensing government money to voting
blocks in amounts impossible for individual political organizers, the
old ward bosses, to administer. Those politicians who set up and
oversaw the bureaucracy were thus able to buy enough votes to ensure
their own election.
BTW, I'm well aware of the various myths that support this transition
and present it as inevitable and well justified. I am here interested
only in describing the driving process, which was competition for
elective office.
I apparently held on to the myth (in the strict sense of "myth") of
equity. Well, wrong again. Worth the effort of writing the above to
jettison the misconception, which was about to get me into trouble.
Identifying the agency involved would defeat my purpose in asking the
question, perhaps with a penalty included, so I don't really want to
do that. Looks like I get to forge ahead on my own. Always wanted a
head! :-)
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Request for Question Clarification by
mathtalk-ga
on
09 Jan 2003 10:28 PST
Nicely written, zylo. Would you perhaps be able to give some more
precise characterization of the types of services involved?
The best way for an agency head to make your participation palatable
to the staff is to present a case that your work entails some risk of
failure and loss of prestige/credibility. In other words, the
director might say something like, "I've been asked to prepare a
report recommending corrective measures for the XYZ program, which has
been noncompliant for NN years. The GAO and Congress are breathing
down my neck on this one, and I've got some calls to return from the
Post _and_ the Times. You may remember that report zylo did for us
last year. Turned out to be spot on, but none of us thought it should
be implemented. Who's willing to take ownership of this thing now?
Of course we could always go back to zylo with song and dance about
updating the earlier report, but I'm open to alternatives..."
As for actually negotiating the terms of a contract, you'll be
tormented over the details by purchasing staff, who have no investment
in getting stuff done but every motive to find things to carp about.
Best wishes.
regards, mathtalk
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Clarification of Question by
zylo-ga
on
11 Jan 2003 10:08 PST
Sorry, wrong citiation. Correct citation is: William Riordan;
_Plunkett of Tammany Hall_; E.P. Dutton, New York, 1963.
Brief overview on:
http://www.albany.edu/~dkw42/tweed.html
which does not describe Tammany's demise. Few sources do.
Political calculation is demonstrably (even spectacularly) responsible
for many of the project's troubles in this particular case. I believe
that the politics has changed, however, and now demand achievement of
the project's goals. I further believe that the agency involved is
seriously trying to save the project involved; let's let things sit
for the time being.
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