As requested I will answer your complex and interesting question in
two parts.
Part one – some biographical notes:
a)
"German philosopher, born at Berlin Feb. 23, 1842, died at the same
place June 5, 1906. He was educated at the school of artillery in
Berlin (1859-1862); and held a commission (1860-65), when he was
compelled to retire on account of serious knee trouble. He took his
degree at Rostock in 1867, returned to Berlin, and retired to
Lichterfelde (5 m. s.w. of Berlin) in 1885, doing most of his work in
bed while suffering great pain. After developing the thought for
twenty-two years, he began in 1864 to prepare his main philosophical
work, Philosophie des Unbewussten (Berlin, 1869; llth ed., 3 vols.,
1904). Next in rank was his Das sittliche Bewusstsein, appearing first
as Phenomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins (Berlin, 1879); and next
to that was the Religionsphilosophie (2 vols., Das religiose
Bewusstein der Menschheit and Die Religion des Geistes, 1882)."
From: The Internet Encyclopdedia of Philosophy
( http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/h/hartmann.htm )
b)
"German metaphysical philosopher, called "the philosopher of the
unconscious," who sought to reconcile two conflicting schools of
thought, rationalism and irrationalism, by emphasizing the central
role of the unconscious mind.
Hartmann, the son of a Prussian artillery officer, was educated for
the army, but a knee injury in 1861 made a military career impossible,
and he began the study of philosophy. His numerous writings include
studies of Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, and G.W.F. Hegel;
metaphysical and psychological works; and studies in religion,
politics, and ethics. His reputation, however, rests primarily on Die
Philosophie des Unbewussten, 3 vol. (1870; The Philosophy of the
Unconscious, 1884), which went through many editions. Notable for the
diversity of its contents, its many concrete examples, and its
vigorous and lucid style, the book also gained for Hartmann an
exaggerated reputation for pessimism. Although he adopted the
pessimistic view of the state of civilization held by Schopenhauer, he
modified it with Hegel's optimistic outlook for the future of
mankind."
From:
The Encyclopedia Britannica Deluxe CD ROM Version 2001
c)
"HARTMANN, KARL ROBERT EDUARD VON (1842-1906),
German philosopher, was born in Berlin on the 23rd of February 1842.
He was educated for the army, and entered the artillery of the Guards
as an officer in 1860, hut a malady of the knee, which crippled him,
forced him to quit the service in 1865. After some hesitation between
music and philosophy, he decided to make the latter the serious work
of his life, and in 1867 the university of Rostock conferred on him
the degree of doctor of philosophy. He subsequently returned to
Berlin, and died at Grosslichterfelde on the 5th of June 1906. His
reputation as a philosopher was established by his first book, The
Philosophy of tile Unconscious (1869; roth ed. 1890)."
From:
(http://54.1911encyclopedia.org/H/HA/HARTMANN_VON_AUE.htm )
Part Two - the philosophical position
a)
"The object of his philosophy was to unite the "idea" of Hegel with
the "will" of Schopenhauer in his doctrine of the Absolute Spirit, or,
as he preferred to characterize it, spiritual monism. He held that " a
will which does not will something is not." The world was produced by
will and idea, but not as conscious; for consciousness, instead of
being essential, is accidental to will and idea-the two poles of " the
Unconscious." Matter is both idea and will. In organic existences, in
instinct, in the human mind, on the field of history, the unconscious
will acts as though it possessed consciousness, i.e., were aware of
the ends and of the infallible means for their realization.
Consciousness arises from the temporary diremption of the idea from
the active will and the will's opposition to this condition. Because
of the wisdom displayed in the action of the Unconscious, this is the
best possible world; only this does not prove that the world is good,
or that the world would not be better, the latter of which is true.
Human life labors under three illusions: (1) that happiness is
possible in this life, which came to an end with the Roman Empire; (2)
that life will be crowned with happiness in another world, which
science is rapidly dissipating; (3) that happy social well-being,
although postponed, can at last be realized on earth, a dream which
will also ultimately be dissolved. Man's only hope lies in "final
redemption from the misery of volition and existence into the
painlessness of non-being and non-willing." No mortal may quit the
task of life, but each must do his part to hasten the time when in the
major portion of the human race the activity of the Unconscious shall
be ruled by intelligence, and this stage reached, in the simultaneous
action of many persons volition will resolve upon its own
non-continuance, and thus idea and will be once more reunited in the
Absolute."
From: The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
( http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/h/hartmann.htm )
b)
"The conception of the Unconscious, by which von Hartmann describes
his ultimate metaphysical principle, is not at bottom as paradoxical
as it sounds, being merely a new and mysterious designation for the
Absolute of German metaphysicians. The Unconscious appears as a
combination of the metaphysic of Hegel with that of Schopenhauer. The
Unconscious is both Will and Reason and the absolute all-embracing
ground of all existence. Von Hartmann thus combines pantheism with
panlogism in a manner adumbrated by Schelling in his positive
philosophy. Nevertheless Will and not Reason is the primary aspect of
the Unconscious, whose melancholy career is determined by the primacy
of the ‘Will and the subservience of the Reason. Precosmically the
Will is potential and the Reason latent, and the Will is void of
reason when it passes from potentiality to actual willing. This latter
is absolute misery, and to cure it the Unconscious evokes its Reason
and with its aid creates the best of all possible worlds, which
contains the promise of its redemption from actual existence by the
emancipation of the Reason from its subjugation to the Will in the
conscious reason of the enlightened pessimist. When the greater part
of the Will in existence is so far enlightened by reason as to
perceive the inevitable misery of existence, a collective effort to
will non-existence will be made, and the world will relapse into
nothingness, the Unconscious into quiescence. Although von Hartmann is
a pessimist, his pessimism is by no means tinmitigated. The
individual’s happiness is indeed unattainable either here and now or
hereafter and in the future, but he does not despair of ultimately
releasing the Unconscious from its sufferings. He differs from
Schopenhauer in making salvation by the “ negation of the Will-to-live
depend on a collective social effort and not on individualistic
asceticism. The conception of a redemption of the Unconscious also
supplies the ultimate basis of von Hartmann’s ethics. We must
provisionally affirm life and devote ourselves to social
evolution, instead of striving after a happiness which is impossible;
in so doing we shall find that morality renders life less unhappy than
it would otherwise be. Suicide, and all other forms of selfishness,
are highly reprehensible. Epistemologically von Hartmann is a
transcendental realist, who ably defends his views and acutely
criticizes those of his opponents. His realism enables him to maintain
the reality of Time, and so of the process of the world’s redemption."
From:
(http://54.1911encyclopedia.org/H/HA/HARTMANN_VON_AUE.htm )
c)
"In a treatise by Eduard von Hartmann entitled The Ultimate Problems
of Epistemology and Metaphysics (see fn 1), my Philosophy of Freedom
has been classed with the philosophical tendency which would base
itself upon an "epistemological monism". Eduard von Hartmann rejects
such a position as untenable. This is explained as follows. According
to the way of thinking expressed in his treatise, there are only three
possible positions in the theory of knowledge.
Firstly, one remains at the naïve point of view, which regards
perceived phenomena as real things existing outside human
consciousness. This implies a lack of critical knowledge. One fails to
realize that with the content of one's consciousness one remains,
after all, only within one's own consciousness. One fails to perceive
that one is dealing, not with a "table-in-itself", but only with an
object in one's own consciousness. Whoever remains at this point of
view, or for whatever reason returns to it, is a naïve realist. But
this whole position is untenable for it fails to recognize that
consciousness has no other objects than its own contents.
Secondly, one appreciates this situation and admits it fully to
oneself. One would then be a transcendental idealist. But then one
would have to deny that anything of a "thing-in-itself" could ever
appear in human consciousness. In this way, however, provided one is
consistent enough, one will not avoid absolute illusionism. For the
world which confronts one now transforms itself into a mere sum of
objects of consciousness, and, moreover, only of objects of one's own
consciousness. One is then compelled -- absurdly enough -- to regard
other people too as being present solely in the content of one's own
consciousness.
The only possible standpoint is the third, transcendental realism.
This assumes that there are "things-in-themselves", but that the
consciousness can have no kind of dealings with them in immediate
experience. Beyond the sphere of human consciousness, and in a way
that does not enter it, they cause the objects of our consciousness to
arise in it. One can arrive at these "things-in-themselves" only by
inference from the content of consciousness, which is all that is
actually experienced but is nevertheless merely pictured in the mind.
Eduard von Hartmann maintains in the article mentioned above that
"epistemological monism" -- for such he takes my point of view to be
-- must in reality accept one of these three positions; and it fails
to do so only because it does not draw the logical conclusions from
its postulates. The article goes on to say:
If one wants to find out which theoretical position a supposed
epistemological monist occupies, one need only put certain questions
to him and compel him to answer them. For such a person will never
willingly commit himself to an expression of opinion on these points,
and will, moreover, seek by all means to evade answering direct
questions, because every answer would show that epistemological monism
cannot claim to be different from one or other of the three positions.
These questions are as follows:
1. Are things continuous or intermittent in their existence? If the
answer is "continuous", then one is dealing with some form of naïve
realism. If the answer is "intermittent", then one has transcendental
idealism. But if the answer is that they are, on the one hand,
continuous (as contents of the absolute consciousness, or as
unconscious mental pictures, or as possibilities of perception), but
on the other hand, intermittent (as contents of limited
consciousness), then transcendental realism is established.
2. When three people are sitting at a table, how many distinct tables
are there: Whoever answers "one" is a naïve realist; whoever answers
"three" is a transcendental idealist; but whoever answers "four" is a
transcendental realist. Here, of course, it is assumed that it is
legitimate to embrace such different things as the one table as a
thing-in-itself and the three tables as perceptual objects in the
three consciousnesses under the common designation of "a table". If
this seems too great a liberty to anyone, he will have to answer "one
and three" instead of "four".
3. When two people are alone together in a room, how many distinct
persons are there: Whoever answers "two" is a naïve realist. Whoever
answers "four" (namely, one self and one other person in each of the
two consciousness) is a transcendental idealist. Whoever answers "six"
(namely, two persons as "things-in-themselves" and four persons as
mentally pictured objects in the two consciousness) is a
transcendental realist.
If anyone wants to show that epistemological monism is different from
any of these three positions, he would have to give a different answer
to each of these three questions; but I would not know what this could
be.
The answers of the Philosophy of Freedom would have to be:
1. Whoever grasps only the perceptual contents of things and takes
these for reality, is a naïve realist, and he does not realize that,
strictly, he ought to regard these perceptual contents as existing
only as long as he is looking at the things, so that he ought to think
of the things before him as intermittent. As soon, however, as it
becomes clear to him that reality is present only in the percepts that
are permeated by thought, he will see that the perceptual contents
which appear as intermittent reveal themselves as continuous as soon
as they are permeated with the results of thinking. Hence we must
count as continuous the perceptual content that has been grasped
through the experience of thinking, of which only that part that is
merely perceived could be regarded as intermittent, if -- which is not
the case -- it were real.
2. When three people are sitting at a table, how many distinct tables
are there? There is only one table present; but as long as the three
people went no further than their perceptual images, they would have
to say, "These perceptual images are not a reality at all." As soon as
they pass on to the table as grasped by their thinking, the one
reality of the table reveals itself to them; then, with their three
contents of consciousness, they are united in this reality.
3. When two people are alone together in a room, how many distinct
persons are there? There are most certainly not six -- not even in the
sense of the transcendental realists -- but only two. All one can say
is that, at the first moment, each person has nothing but the unreal
perceptual image of himself and of the other person. There are four of
these images, and through their presence in the thinking activity of
the two people, reality is grasped. In this activity of thinking each
person transcends his own sphere of consciousness; in it the
consciousness of the other person as well as of himself comes to life.
In these moments of coming to life the two people are as little
enclosed within their own consciousness as they are in sleep. But at
other moments the awareness of the absorption in the other person
appears again, so that the consciousness of each person, in the
experience of thinking, apprehends both himself and the other. I know
that a transcendental realist describes this as a relapse into naïve
realism. But then, I have already pointed out in this book that naïve
realism retains its justification for the thinking that is
experienced.
The transcendental realist will have nothing whatever to do with the
true state of affairs regarding the process of knowledge; he cuts
himself off from the facts by a tissue of thoughts and entangles
himself in it. Moreover, the monism which appears in The Philosophy of
Freedom ought not to be labeled "epistemological", but, if an epithet
is wanted, then a "monism of thought". All this has been misunderstood
by Eduard von Hartmann. He has ignored all that is specific in the
argumentation of The Philosophy of Freedom, and has stated that I have
attempted to combine Hegel's universalistic panlogism with Hume's
individualistic phenomenalism (see fn 2), whereas in fact The
Philosophy of Freedom has nothing whatever to do with the two
positions it is allegedly trying to combine. (This, too, is the reason
why I could not feel inclined, for example, to go into the
"epistemological monism" of Johannes Rehmke. The point of view of The
Philosophy of Freedom is simply quite different from what Eduard von
Hartmann and others call epistemological monism.)"
From:
(http://www.elib.com/Steiner/Books/GA004/TPOF/pofapp.html )
d)
"Edward Von Hartmann. A different form of pessimism to that of
Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer he condemns as a Quietist, which amounts to
no more than an Epicurean. He claims to effect a reconciliation
between Schopenhauer and Hegel, which he does, though through a point
of view that is utterly fantastic. See how close the movement is to
the development of the Mahayana, the bodhisattva instead of the arhat.
We are all one, he says, so not only is suicide useless, even
individual salvation is too. No individual escape is possible, because
we are all one. Our innermost essence, the Unconscious, unites us all.
So the extinction that is preferable to existence, is not possible on
an individual level. He suggests it is possible, finally and
absolutely, when a majority of the will in existence in the universe
decides to will annihilation. Lower forms of life and intellect do not
so clearly perceive the great truth that nothingness is better than
existing. Evolution therefore consists in an advance in misery and
pessimism. This is desirable, because it is to bring about the
ultimately desirable end, extermination of lower life forms, and the
decision for the will to annihilate itself, and therefore everything.
Reading that book I see how nineteenth century German metaphysics
forms a continuous discussion."
From:
(http://www.mith.demon.co.uk/schopenhauer.htm )
till-ga
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