Are there any examples of submarines influencing, (or being claimed to
have influenced) decisions of enemy governments since about 1970
(apart from in the Falklands)?
I am not interested in anything to do with Nuclear missiles, but only
in conventional confrontations.
I am also not interested in when they launched cruise missiles against
Land Targets.
What I am interested in is examples of when it was claimed that the
enemy was deterred from doing something by the possibility of
submarines being around.
The two examples I can think of are both in the Falklands. In 1977 HMS
Dreadnought may have helped prevent an Argentine Invasion.  In 1982
the presence of Submarines may have made the Argentine fleet stay in
port during the Falklands War.
Can you think of other examples when the enemy?s decisions were
influenced by the possible presence of submarines?

---

Request for Question Clarification by pafalafa-ga on 16 Mar 2004 08:11 PST

Kind of depends what you mean by "enemy".  North Korea and China both
have substantial submarine fleets, and the presence of these is
certainly a factor in how the US and other countries monitor and
respond to these two countries.

Would examples involving response of the US or our allies to either of
these two countries be something you're looking for?

---

Clarification of Question by mikeyoung-ga on 16 Mar 2004 09:27 PST

By enemy I mean "opposing political entity". Threats by North Korean
or Chinese Subs are fine. What I want is instances when political
decisions have been influenced by the threat of submarine warfare, and
if the submarines had not been there then different political actions
would have possibly been taken.
In the examples I know it was claimed the Argentinians did not invade
the Falklands in 1977 because of the subs, and that they did not
reinforce the islands by sea in 1982 because they were afraid of the
subs.
Of course there are usually many factors influencing such decisions. 
All I am looking for is claims that the submarines influenced the
decision.

Dear mikeyoung-ga;

Thank you for allowing me an opportunity to answer your interesting question.

CANADA & SPAIN 

The ?turbot dispute? between Canada and Spain in 1995 is a prime
example of conventional submarines affecting policy. Examples of this
kind with regard to this particular conflict are many (search terms: 
submarine "turbot dispute") :

?Turning to response, by the end of the Cold War Oberon-class
submarines were routinely deployed on patrol in the Atlantic against
Soviet vessels of interest thereby gaining access to intelligence of
US naval submarine operations in Canadian waters. Since 1990 the
Oberons have been used on sovereignty patrols in support of fisheries
and the RCMP. HMCS Ojibwa's patrol on Georges Bank in 1993 and HMCS
Okanagan's patrol on the Grand Banks in 1994 were very successful
while the deterrent value of a submarine presence during the Turbot
dispute with Spain and the European Union in 1995 was a decided
advantage for Canadian diplomacy.?
SUBMARINES FOR CANADA - STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
http://www.naval.ca/article/crickard/submarinesforcanada_byfwcrickard.html


CHINA & TAIWAN

The same is true for the conflict between China and Taiwan:

March 11, 1998
?The traditional objective of the United States in the Taiwan Strait
has been to prevent conflict until the People's Republic of China
(PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan settle their
differences peacefully. To this end, under the provisions of the 1979
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the United States has sold defensive
weapons to Taiwan to deter an attack by China?The TRA implies that the
United States will come to Taiwan's aid in the event of an attack.
Washington's willingness to do so was made clear in March 1996 when
China undertook threatening military exercises on the eve of Taiwan's
presidential election. The United States responded with its most
powerful show of military force toward China since the Taiwan Strait
crises of the 1950s. The U.S. Navy deployed 2 aircraft carriers and 36
ships and submarines in support.?
CHINA'S ARMS REQUIRE BETTER U.S. MILITARY TIES WITH TAIWAN
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/BG1163.cfm


China has exercised restraint in its rhetoric against Taiwan and in
like manner Taiwan has toned down it?s insubordination against China
due in large part to the presence of conventional submarines by both
countries and the United States.

In addition, even the potential for Taiwan to ?acquire? conventional
submarines from the United States serves as a deterrent in itself, as
seen in the same article:

?With six to eight additional small conventional submarines Taiwan's
navy can deter PLA ships and subs that would carry these new
supersonic missiles.?

This may change as the US tries to upgrade Taiwan?s defences to match
those of China, in particular with regard to submarine usage:

?Initial consideration needs to be given to Taiwan?s own ability to
defend itself. The United States acknowledges and has begun an attempt
to remedy some of Taiwan?s deficiencies in such ?functional
nonhardware? areas of concern as ?defense planning, C4I, air defense,
maritime capability, anti-submarine warfare, logistics, joint force
integration, and training.? It has nevertheless failed to provide
sufficient military means for self-defence. In this regard, there is a
particular requirement for improved antisubmarine weapons (including
modern submarines and maritime patrol aircraft), mine countermeasures,
strike capabilities (to counter-deter those of China), and air
defences.75 American reluctance to supply (tactically) ?offensive?
weapons has unnecessarily restricted Taiwan?s defence capabilities.?
DEFENDING TAIWAN, AND WHY IT MATTERS
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Autumn/art4-au1.htm


CHINA & MEMBERS OF THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION

China?s deployment of conventional submarines convinced members
attending 1992?s ASEAN Foreign Ministers? Meeting in Manila that China
had ulterior motives and new policy needed to be developed to deal
with China?s activities:

?Invariably, subsequent developments have shown China to be impervious
to the Declaration as it has disregarded all restraints by deploying
three Romeo-class conventional submarines from its North Sea Fleet to
the South China Sea to patrol the contested areas.  Such Chinese
actions have persuaded more hawkish ASEAN members who had participated
in the workshops to believe that China is alas engaged in the
deceitful process of what is known as ?talk and take.?
THE TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY PROCESS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
http://hpair.student.harvard.edu/research/hpair99/brief2a.doc



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Tutuzdad-ga ? Google Answers Researcher



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Conventional submarine deter deterrence prevent prevention

A very good set of answers.  Well done tutuzdad