I would like information on how, in the U.S.'s war on terror,
helicopters, tanks, artillery, and other such traditional weapons are
still needed, despite the new face of terrorism.  Is the U.S. military
justified in continuing to spend money on what some see as
"anachronistic" weapons?

Dear Mooflaman, 

As the commentators (esp. Alan Kali, but also Alex) have noted, there
is a problem in the definition of who is a terrorist. A self-declared
"War on Terrorism" could be pointed against a variance of weapons,
enemies and methods.

First of all, one should distinguish between high intensity conflicts
(war) and low intensity conflicts (=guerrilla fighting and terrorism).
Weapons are being changed all the time. In Medieval times, men used to
fight with swords and spears. The industrial revolution brought with
it the usage of automated weapons, vehicles, and other motor
equipment. In the last several decades we are facing a new revolution
- the information revolution, which introduced new weapons and
techniques to the army. This is the so-called "Revolution in Military
Affairs" (RMA). The usage of satellites, computers and "smart bombs"
could be all categorised under this latest development.

The American Military is facing this question that you raise and
discusses it. You can see an old, but important, document, here:
*FM 7-98: OPERATIONS IN A LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
<http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/f798.htm>.

The so-called "War on Terrorism" could be divided into two: high
intensity conflict ("regular" war), like operation ?Iraqi Freedom?;
and low-intensity conflicts, who are mainly against guerrilla fighters
and irregular troupes. The Military hardly deals with "regular"
terrorists, and when fighting guerrilla - bringing the military forces
to the place of action is essential, hence the usage of machine such
as helicopters (to mobilise troupes).

Arial transportation and warfare is becoming more and more important
to the success of low-intensity conflicts. The guerrilla fighters have
advantage in the territory, and traditional mobilisation and warfare
will not fare well in these areas. However, guerrilla fighters in Iraq
and Afghanistan gained anti-aircraft missiles, and the advantage of
aerial operations is now somewhat diminished. See more about it at:
TIMOTHY L. THOMAS , "Air Operations in Low Intensity Conflict"
Aerospace Power Journal - Winter 1997
<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj97/win97/thomas.html>.
In Low Intensity Conflicts, small units have great significance, while
using what you might call "traditional weapons".

Thinking is being done all the time - for example, tanks are hardly
being produced anymore as well as other machines or vehicles that do
not fit the RMA.

Read more: 

Fighting Terrorism, Avoiding War - The Indo-Pakistani Situation
by Peter R. Lavoy, Joint Forces Quarterly, 2002
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0732.pdf>.

Victory in Low-intensity Conflicts by MAJ Matthew Kee Yeow Chye,
Journal of Singapore Armed Forces,  Journal V26 N4 (Oct - Dec 2000) ,
<http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2000/Vol26_4/4.htm>.

CONFLICT BETWEEN AND WITHIN STATES, PERSPECTIVES, a CANADIAN SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE publication, Report # 2000/06, August 8, 2000
<http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/miscdocs/200006_e.html>.

Military Operations Against Terrorist Groups Abroad: Implications for
the United States Air Force, 2003
<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1738/>

Aerospace Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring New Concepts,
2000 <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1187/>

Jochen Hippler, Low intensity warfare and its implications for NATO,
<http://www.jochen-hippler.de/Aufsatze/low-intensity_conflict/low-intensity_conflict.html>

To sum up: some of the "traditional" weapons do diminish, others are
used in different ways than was originally intended; new weapons are
being developed, to deal with the new threat. Intelligence and
information technology continues to be a main component in today's
usage of weapons - old and new.

SEARCH STRATEGY: "high intensity conflict?, "low intensity conflict",
terrorism, weapons. Most importantly, I talked with an expert on the
subject.

I hope this answered your question. Please contact me if you need any
further clarification on this answer before you rate it.

Seems like kind of a loaded question. Of course, we are starting with
a loaded term, "War on Terrorism."

Terrorism is a tactic, not a specific enemy. Assume for the moment
that we really mean, "War on Al-Quaeda" or even more broadly, "War on
Militant Islamic Fundamentalists" which would include Al-Quaeda's
like-minded allies.

In that case, traditional military hardware is sometimes useful at
certain stages of confronting militants, but only in the context of a
broader approach that would include diplomacy with countries where
they operate, cooperation with international financial organizations
that enable such groups to move and access their financial support, as
well as traditional espionage and law enforcement efforts to identify
and apprehend their members.

That said, terrorism is hardly the only conflict the US and other
nations face today. Traditional weapons may be useless in tracking
down an al-Quaeda sleeper cell waiting to park a car bomb outside an
embassy, but they are vital as deterrents and in the event of conflict
in other parts of the world. Two likely flashpoints where US military
force could be called to action in the coming years are in the
Pacific--China/Taiwan, and North Korea.

Here is one final scenario, one more relevant to the question and
situation at hand.

The invasion of Iraq was old as a pre-emptive strike against a regime
that was in imminent danger of striking back at us. I believe that was
a false premise, but I do believe that the standard criticism of our
involvement in Iraq - "blood for oil" - is the only compelling reason
for our continued involvement there.

Saudi Arabia sits on top of the world's largest proven reserves of
oil, and Iraq is on number 2. The Saudi Royal family holds its power
with force and through strained alliances... the Saudi people have no
great love for their king. They have uneasy alliances with
fundamentalist Islamic groups (not too far removed from al-Quaeda) and
it is not unthinkable, in fact, it quite probable that we could see a
militant Islamic group seize control of Saudi Arabia. Now consider
that Iraq, on the verge of civil war, could easily be overtaken,
ironically even as the outcome of a US-backed democratic election, by
radical anti-US factions. This would leave control of much of the
world's oil in the hands of a group determined to dominate the globe,
and with their hands on the lifeblood of Western economies.

I'll tell you, if that happens, I hope to hell we do have a military
strong enough and capable enough and with enough modern weapons to
seize middle eastern oilfields.

Mr. Alex,

Your answer is honest, bold and thoughtful; I am impressed.

One additional issue in regards to the word "terrorism": I have
noticed that it has been applied to the sporadic outbreaks of violence
in Iraq since the official cessation of hostilities, but that
approximately one week ago, concomitant with the outbreak of
widespread uprising, media outlets began referring to attacks by using
the word "guerilla" instead of "terrorist". This happened even though
the tactics were the same.

It seems therefore that the word, "terrorist", as it is commonly used
today, may refer less to a tactic of warfare than to the behaviour of
individuals or groups with which the mainstream of society disagrees,
and whom we wish to portray as disturbed, disaffected or otherwise not
representative of widely held beliefs.

In the space of one week, a "terrorist" sniping at Marine convoys from
a concealed location in Fallujah becomes a "guerilla", based simply
upon the fact that it strains credibility to refer by any other name
to the actions of a movement which may represent a significant
fraction of a population.

Best Regards,

Alan Kali

Alan:

Of course... one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter or martyr.

For reasons in my comment above, I don't like the term "War on
Terrorism" as a the US government's rallying cry. The problem is that
for any war to succeed, there has to be a clear objective that can be
attained; "terrorism" can never be completely defeated. A cycnical
view is that the government likes it this way--we can always redefine
terrorism as time goes on to suit our needs, and use the fear and
urgency of war to ask for sacrifice and expediency. Same with the "War
on Drugs."

One thing that gets back to the original question is what value are
tanks and helicopters against a terrorist? The problem partly lies
with the fact that we still view "war" in WWII terms, where the enemy
was a nation seeking to achieve its goals with armed force, which we
responded to with our own armed force. In WWII, the soldiers were
motivated by patriotism and nationalism and a sense of duty. The
armies fought as logistically complex units, and could be attacked
along supply lines or command and control lines. Defeat the head of
state, and the army stops fighting.

The enemy we have now, however, does not fight that way. We call them
terrorists, and by extension, lunatics and madmen--willing to die for
their 72 virgins, my, how uncivilized. There is truth in the charge of
fanaticism--there is no shortage of volunteers of suicide attacks. But
what are they trying to achieve? How does attacking the US help them
achieve their goals?

I have heard that they hate us because we don't know why they hate us.
They hate freedom and democracy. They envy our wealth and power. They
hate our support of Israel and our presence in the Middle East.

Some half truths there, some propoganda. What they dream of is a new
Islamic Empire. They see moderate, secular governments in Islamic
countries as targets. Their goal is to destablize and overthrow such
governments and replace their leaders with radical fundamentalists and
institute sharia law. Ironically, Saddam's government was secular, and
by removing him and creating a power vacuum in Iraq we may end up
helping them achieve what they want in Iraq. The goal is a network of
Islamic states, which holds a position of dominance in the world
thanks to its control of oil.

Attacking the US is not an effort to defeat the US governemnt... it is
an effort to limit US influence in the Middle East. Bin Laden and his
followers learned in Aghanistan in the 80s against the Soviets that a
determined force willing to endure hardship can defeat a Superpower.
They hope to do the same with us.

Mr. Alex:

It seems as if you are hinting at a conception I have pondered before.
 Many civilizations, societies, etc., use a promise to return to a
previous glory as a motivating force.  We see this in Mussolini's
(sp?) Fascist Italy, the Golden Age being the Roman Empire, and
through Fascism they could achieve a return to it.  Looking to Hitler
and the Germanic conquests of Europe over the ages, we see the same. 
Countless dictators and despots have used the method.

What I am getting at here is that these terrorists, martyrs, be what
they may, are attempting to establish an Islamic Empire (such as you
suggested) to rival the Muslim empires of the Crusading ages, such as
the Seljuk Turks, Ottomans, etc.  Perhaps our more traditional weapons
do act as deterrents to the foundation of a radically conservative
Islamic empire.

However, deterrence and exacerbation seem to be two sides of the same
coin.  While this overpowering firepower may be a deterrent to
widespread military/terrorist action, could it not be a motivating
factor for recruitment for al-Qaeda and the like?  Drawing upon these
historical notions of "the other", that is, some culture different
from your own, invading your homeland seems to be the fashionable
thing to do for these terrorists.  So here is my question:  Is the
continued production and use of these weapons, indeed, of U.S. global
military action, an effective foreign policy for the U.S.?

Back to your original question: Are conventional weapons useful to US
foriegn policy?

In my opinion: US leadership, namely Bush, has completely fumbled the
ball in his use of the military in Iraq. He is, as you note, doing
more for bin Laden's cause than ours.

But the fact that Bush and his administration lack the judgement to
use the military effectively does not mean that it can't be done. In
many cases, simply having the power ensures the peace. I believe the
US used it's military at least partially effectively in Bosnia, and I
think we also effectively used our military in Gulf War 1, although we
disengaged to soon. As I pointed out before, there are other areas in
the world that could be potential conflicts that we may need to
respond to--China is a big one, either in Taiwan, on the Korean
peninsula, or the Spratley islands, to name a few candidates--our
involvement in Iraq weakens our ability to respond or even appear
capable of responding, which may embolden China or its satellites.

The problem now is that we gotten into this mess and we need to find a
graceful way out. I believe it is going to get worse before it gets
better regardless of who wins in November.

You might want to take a look at Seymour Hersh's article in the April
12, 2004 New Yorker Magazine. "The Other War".  Hersh, who has a fine
reputation as a military reporter, notes that DoD has done it's own
analysis of the war in Afghanistan -- done by the office of Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Army Col. (Ret.) Hy
Rothstein.  Rothstein treats the timing and use of technology and is
critical of the application of the Rumsfeld doctrine of applying
technology instead of traditional forces and manpower.

Not surprisingly, the Pentagon has tried to keep Rothstein's analysis secret.

Best regards,

Omnivorous-GA