Hi xlr8s1v1ce,
After filtering out the repetitive articles, the following is the
result of my research:
The Desert Camp, February 1999
"During the winter of 1998-99, intelligence reported that Bin Ladin
frequently visited a camp in the desert adjacent to a larger hunting
camp in Helmand province of Afghanistan, used by visitors from a Gulf
state. Public sources have stated that these visitors were from the
United Arab Emirates. At the beginning of February, Bin Ladin was
reportedly located there, and apparently remained for more than a
week. This was not in an urban area, so the risk of collateral damage
was minimal. Intelligence provided a detailed description of the
camps. National technical intelligence confirmed the description of
the larger camp and showed the nearby presence of an official aircraft
of the UAE. The CIA received reports that Bin Ladin regularly went
from his adjacent camp to the larger camp where he visited with
Emiratis. The location of this larger camp was confirmed by February
9, but the location of Bin Ladin?s quarters could not be pinned down
so precisely. Preparations were made for a possible strike at least
against the larger camp, perhaps to target Bin Ladin during one of his
visits. No strike was launched.
According to CIA officials, policymakers were concerned about the
danger that a strike might kill an Emirati prince or other senior
officials who might be with Bin Ladin or close by. The lead CIA
official in the field felt the intelligence reporting in this case was
very reliable; the UBL unit chief at the time agrees. The field
official believes today that
this was a lost opportunity to kill Bin Ladin before 9/11.
Clarke told us the strike was called off because the intelligence was
dubious, and it seemed to him as if the CIA was presenting an option
to attack America?s best counterterrorism ally in the Gulf.
Documentary evidence at the time shows that on February 10 Clarke
detailed to Deputy National Security Adviser Donald Kerrick the
intelligence placing UBL in the camp, informed him that DOD might be
in position to fire the next morning, and added that General Shelton
was looking at other options that might be ready the following week.
Clarke had just returned from a visit to the UAE, working on
counterterrorism cooperation and following up on a May 1998 UAE
agreement to buy F-16 aircraft from the United States. On February 10,
Clarke reported that a top UAE official had vehemently denied that
high-level UAE officials were in Afghanistan. Evidence subsequently
confirmed that high-level UAE officials had been hunting there.
By February 12 Bin Ladin had apparently moved on and the immediate
strike plans became moot. In March the entire camp complex was
hurriedly disassembled. We are still examining several aspects of this
episode."
Sources:
Find Law: 911 Commission: Staff Statement No. 6 - Military
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/911comm-ss6.pdf
Global Research: Transcript of 9/11 Commission Hearings
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/COM403A.html
==========================================
"In February 1999, the Pentagon drew up plans to fire cruise missiles
at a hunting camp in Helmand province in Afghanistan that bin Laden
frequented, but the strike was called off out of fear it could kill an
Emiri prince who could have been with the Qaida leader or nearby. "The
lead CIA official in the field felt the intelligence reporting in this
case was very reliable," one of the staff reports said. "The field
official believes today that this was a lost opportunity to kill bin
Laden."
How did 9/11 happen?
Bush, Clinton administrators explain why they missed the warnings
Google's cache of http://www.reporter-news.com/abil/nw_state/article/0,1874,ABIL_7974_2753815,00.html
==========================================
"... In early February 1999, for example, the CIA received information
- human and electronic - that bin Laden planned a one-week visit to a
hunting lodge in the Helmand Province of Afghanistan.
It was an isolated area, where damage would be minimal, and the
intelligence reportedly provided detailed descriptions of the camps.
But according to CIA officials, policymakers worried that a strike
might kill a prince or other
officials from the UAE, who were also lodged at the camp. Richard
Clarke, the former counterterrorism official in both the Clinton and
Bush administrations, reportedly talked with UAE officials, who denied
anyone from their government
was there. But evidence later confirmed that they were."
The Christian Science Monitor: Averting 9/11: How close we came
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0325/p01s01-usfp.html
==========================================
"...The next opportunity came in February 1999 after US intelligence
reported that bin Laden frequently visited a hunting camp in
Afghanistan's Helmand province that was frequented by visitors from
the United Arab Emirates.
"At the beginning of February, bin Laden was reportedly located there
and apparently remained for more than a week," said Philip Zelikow,
the commission's executive director.
"This was not in an urban area so the risk of collateral damage was
minimal. Intelligence provided a detailed description of the camps.
National technical intelligence confirmed the description of the
larger camp and showed the nearby presence of an official aircraft of
the UAE," he said.
Preparations were made for a strike, but it was never launched.
"According to CIA officials, policy-makers were concerned about the
danger that a strike might kill an emirate prince or other senior
officials who might be with bin Laden or close by," Zelikow said.
"The field official believes today that this was a lost opportunity to
kill bin Laden before 9/11," he said.
The next chance to kill bin Laden came in May 1999 when sources
reported in detail on bin Laden's whereabouts in Kandahar over a
five-day period.
But CIA officials were told the strikes were not ordered because of
concern over the precision of the source's reporting and the risk of
collateral damage.
"Having a chance to get OBL (Osama bin Laden) three times in 36 hours
and forgoing the chance each time has made me a bit angry," the chief
of the unit tracking bin Laden wrote to a frustrated colleague.
"The DCI (director of central intelligence) finds himself alone at the
table with the other principals basically saying,'We'll go along with
your decision, Mr. Director,' and implicitly saying, 'The agency will
hang alone if the attack doesn't get bin Laden,'" the reported quoted
him as writing."
INQ7: US had Bin Laden in sight 3 times but balked: commission
http://www.inq7.net/wnw/2004/mar/25/wnw_5-1.htm
==========================================
"The most tantalizing case was in February 1999, when bin Laden spent
a week at a remote hunting camp in Afghanistan's Helmand province. But
senior officials from the United Arab Emirates, a purported American
ally, were also at the camp. The strike was called off because, as CIA
Director George J. Tenet testified last week, "You might have wiped
out half the royal family in the UAE in the process." CIA officers in
the field would later describe it as a major missed opportunity to
kill bin Laden."
The Oakland Press: Could 9/11 have been avoided?
http://www.theoaklandpress.com/stories/032904/pol_20040329065.shtml
==========================================
"In February 1999, the CIA received reports that bin Laden was at a
desert camp in Afghanistan adjacent to a larger hunting camp in
Helmand province. The location of the larger camp was confirmed on
February 9 but the location of bin Laden's quarters could not be
determined precisely. Preparations were made for a strike against the
larger camp, but it was not launched. CIA officials said policy-makers
were concerned that an attack might kill innocents."
CNN: Pre-9/11 strike plans against al Qaeda
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/03/23/911.commission.strikes.ap/
==========================================
"There were at least four potential opportunities to try to kill bin
Laden in Afghanistan from December 1998 to July 1999. Cruise missile
strikes were prepared but never approved for fear of civilian
casualties and because of doubts that bin Laden would still be there
when a missile landed hours later, a commission staff report said.
One of those opportunities came in February 1999 when intelligence
reports pinpointed bin Laden near a hunting camp in the Helmand
province of Afghanistan used by visitors from the United Arab
Emirates. CIA officials told the commission that policymakers were
concerned that a strike might kill an Emirati prince or other senior
officials who might be with Bin Laden or nearby.
The commission staff report said one CIA official ?believes today that
this was a lost opportunity to kill bin Laden before 9/11?.
Cohen, who was defence secretary under President Clinton, reminded the
commission that when that administration bombed a pharmaceutical plant
in Sudan in 1998 that it believed might help bin Laden acquire
chemical weapons, it met a lot of public criticism that it was a
mistake. He said he would do it again..."
Daily Times: Rumsfeld says early strikes wouldn?t have stopped 9/11
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_25-3-2004_pg7_39
==========================================
You may find this interesting:
Southpaw
http://southpaw.goodshow.net/archives/000391.html
Search criteria:
"bin laden" emirates camp
"bin laden" UAE camp Helmand
bin laden" emirates camp 1999 Helmand
I hope the information provided is helpful. If you have any questions
regarding my answer please don?t hesitate to ask before rating it.
Best regards,
Rainbow |
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