International Relations Theory - The Relative Gains Debate within Realism
Category: Relationships and Society > Politics
Asked by: metalcore9-ga
List Price: $10.00
28 Feb 2006 12:30 PST
Expires: 30 Mar 2006 12:30 PST
Question ID: 701987
Within the Realist paradigm of political science exists a relative gains debate. The debate asks: do states refuse to enter into mutually beneficial agreements with other states because they fear the other state will gain more? I need: 1) Citations for 8-10 of the most relevant works within this debate 2) Brief summaries of these relevant works (as short as a few sentences). I do NOT want non-realist perspectives on the issue. I am only interested in the relative gains debate within realism.
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Re: International Relations Theory - The Relative Gains Debate within Realism
From: frde-ga on 05 Mar 2006 05:39 PST
Any 'game' depends on the 'certainty' of the outcome. If it is totally predictable then the participents will 'trade' one sided benefits. In the vernacular, they will 'hold the other player over a barrel'. Or more bluntly, a blackmailer assesses the ability of his victim to pay. Does a rational entity derive satisfaction from both being worse off themselves and seeing someone else worse off as a result ? Only if they reckon that they were offered a lousy deal, so that they are avoiding settling for a sub-optimum. Add imperfect knowledge and unrealistic expectations, and your scenario is possible, but /only/ because the nett outcome is /not/ mutually beneficial. eg: I am $10 better off, you are $1 better off, but I am seething with resentment because I (the perceived major beneficiary) reckon that you have stitched me up.
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