Within the Realist paradigm of political science exists a relative
gains debate. The debate asks: do states refuse to enter into mutually
beneficial agreements with other states because they fear the other
state will gain more?

I need:
1) Citations for 8-10 of the most relevant works within this debate 
2) Brief summaries of these relevant works (as short as a few sentences).

I do NOT want non-realist perspectives on the issue. I am only
interested in the relative gains debate within realism.

Any 'game' depends on the 'certainty' of the outcome.

If it is totally predictable then the participents will 'trade' one sided benefits.

In the vernacular, they will 'hold the other player over a barrel'.

Or more bluntly, a blackmailer assesses the ability of his victim to pay.

Does a rational entity derive satisfaction from both being worse off
themselves and seeing someone else worse off as a result ?

Only if they reckon that they were offered a lousy deal, so that they
are avoiding settling for a sub-optimum.

Add imperfect knowledge and unrealistic expectations, and your
scenario is possible, but /only/ because the nett outcome is /not/
mutually beneficial.

eg: I am $10 better off, you are $1 better off, but I am seething with
resentment because I (the perceived major beneficiary) reckon that you
have stitched me up.