Clarification of Answer by
easterangel-ga
on
11 Oct 2002 19:19 PDT
In answering the second clarification let us first establish the
nations which have fissile materials. Please bear with me.
This website from the ISIS provides a summary of nations which possess
these types of materials.
http://www.isis-online.org/mapproject/supplements.html
Another table of inventory of fissile materials (1999 article) is
found here.
Negotiating a fissile-material cut-off treaty
http://www.defencejournal.com/dec98/fissile.htm
It is true that the so called rogue nations are not within this list
but an interesting article from the same website informs us that they
are more than capable of possessing such potentially destructive
material.
Historically, neptunium 237 and americium have been separated by the
nuclear weapon states in only small quantities, principally for
non-explosive usesas target materials for plutonium 238 production,
and for smoke detectors, neutron generators, and research activities.
International commerce in neptunium and americium is very small.
Although the information is incomplete, non-nuclear weapon states are
believed to possess little separated neptunium or americium.
Current controls and monitoring practices do not provide the
international community with adequate assurance that these materials
are not being used to make nuclear explosives. A principal concern is
that a civilian reprocessing facility or a waste treatment facility in
full compliance with its safeguards obligations could extract
neptunium or americium that would not be under any international
inspections.
Although no country has stated it has used neptunium 237 in a nuclear
explosive device, neptunium 237 is considered usable in nuclear
weapons. It has a bare-sphere metal critical mass of about 60
kilograms, and in metal form it is easier to compress than highly
enriched uranium (HEU). About 30 kilograms or less would be sufficient
to create a crude implosion device. With a half-life of more than two
million years, neptunium 237 has no heat or radiation properties that
would complicate its use in a nuclear explosive. Because it has a low
neutron background, it could also be used in a gun-type device,
although a larger quantity would be required.
Russia, the United States, and other nuclear weapon states have
exported neptunium 237. From 1950 to April 1998, the United States
exported only about a kilogram of separated neptunium 237 to 12
countries. In order of amounts, the recipients of more than 98 percent
of the material were Germany, Belgium, Britain, Israel, Japan, and
India. Russian exports are less known; it has not provided the IAEA
with an accounting of its neptunium exports before 1994. Britain sold
Iraq 200 milligrams of neptunium oxide in the 1980s. About a quarter
of it was irradiated to produce plutonium 238, which Iraq evaluated as
a material for a neutron initiator for nuclear weapons. The rest of
the plutonium was used in reprocessing research and development
activities at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center south of Baghdad.
Troubles Tomorrow? Separated Neptunium 237 and Americium --David
Albright and Lauren Barbour
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/fmct/book/New%20chapter%205.pdf
Now what does this article suggest. It insinuates that at this point
due to practices in the past, other nations may already be in
possession of materials capable of production for nuclear weaponry and
should be a cause for concern.
Now for the most important part, if they possess these fissile
materials, are they now capable of having nuclear weapons in such a
short time? I dont presume that the following articles will
completely answer your suspicion but they might be a source of
enlightenment.
A study of countries by the United States in the past could bring into
light some of our questions.
Algeria:
Algeria has renounced nuclear weapons, signing the Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) and submitting to International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) controls. However, they are continuing with a nuclear program
which greatly exceeds their civil needs and which in two years may
have the facilities necessary to produce military plutonium, the key
element in nuclear weapons. So warns a confidential report written in
July by the Cesid, according to whom, Algeria will be at the end of
the century in a technical position to go nuclear if the authorities
so decide.
The IAEA inspections of the Algerian facilities produced tensions, as
they discovered that 3 kilograms of enriched uranium, some liters of
heavy water, and various pieces of natural uranium supplied by China
had not been declared to the IAEA.
The Es Salam reactor has the theoretical capacity to produce up to 3
kilograms of plutonium annually, but the report estimates that only a
few grams could be diverted for military purposes without being
detected by the international controls.
"El Cesid warns that Algeria can have the capacity to produce military
plutonium in two years" (1998 report)
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/algeria/elpais.html
Iran: 1995 report
The information that is available does not indicate how Iran might
produce fissile material, or even if it has chosen one particular
method. A senior U.S. official told me that intelligence information
indicates Iran has not yet made a choice.
As previously noted, Iran might steal fissile material or buy it on
the black market, either in pure or impure forms. Constructing
facilities to purify plutonium or to produce highly enriched uranium
and fashion bomb components is probably within Iran's reach, although
some foreign procurement might be necessary.
Failing overseas acquisition of fissile material, Iran would have to
develop the capability to make and separate plutonium or to enrich
uranium. As yet, Iran does not possess a nuclear reactor that can
produce significant quantities of plutonium, despite years of trying
to obtain one, nor does it have a plutonium separation plant. As
Secretary Christopher said on May 1, For years, Iran has been trying
to purchase heavy-water research reactors that are best suited to
producing weapon-grade plutonium, not electricity.
"An Iranian bomb?" By David Albright
http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1995/ja95/ja95.albright.html
In this much recent report by the same author it can be inferred that
although North Korea has the facilities for making nuclear weapons
through the fissile materials, its stocks are not significant enough
to cause alarm at this point but still would be a concern.
Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/book/app3.html
South Africa meanwhile is a different case altogether since it is
perceived in this report that it has already succeeded in creating
established facilities to make nuclear weapons. Furthermore; this
report suggests that only a fraction of South Africas facilities are
needed by terrorist groups in order to achieve such an effect.
South Africas Nuclear Weaponization Efforts : Success on a
Small-Scale
By David Albright and Corey Hinderstein
September 13, 2001
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/terrorism/safrica.pdf
Yugoslavia meanwhile is a country which stresses that premise of your
suspicion is not black and white or simple as may seem. Diplomacy,
international relations and the personalities of current leaders all
have a say in the issue.
Should we worry about 60 kilograms of 80 percent highly enriched
uranium at the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Science outside Belgrade
being turned into nuclear weapons by a desperate Yugoslav
government?.
Despite the site's increasing international isolation, most officials
interviewed in the course of preparing this paper believe that
Yugoslavia would not divert the highly enriched uranium and, in fact,
would have a hard time producing a nuclear weapon. Why would President
Slobodan Milosevic risk alienating his Russian allies, his most
important friends right now? Even though Russia strongly opposes the
NATO strikes against its Slavic cousin, it is unlikely to tolerate a
decision by Yugoslavia to arm itself with nuclear weapons, or for that
matter, to accept deteriorating physical protection arrangements over
the Russian-supplied highly enriched uranium.
No evidence of any current weapons work exists. IAEA and U.S.
officials have given no indication that Yugoslavia could produce a
nuclear explosive quickly, i.e. within weeks or a few months, or that
it has any intentions to do so. However, information that allows an
independent judgement of Yugoslavia's intentions or current technical
capability is limited. If the Yugoslavian government decided to make a
nuclear explosive, it may be able to do so, although probably not
quickly.
What about Yugoslavia's Nuclear Explosive Material?
April 21, 1999
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/yugoslavia/yugoslavia499.html
What do these articles have to do with your suspicions? The cases in
Algeria, South American and could be ones that could establish your
point. However; if we consider other real world factors, the cases of
North Korea and Yoguslavia shows that its not as easy as ABC.
I hope that this time I was of help to your query.
Regards,
Easterangel-ga