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Q: Law, Illinois and Texas, Civil Suits, Plaintif Rights ( Answered 5 out of 5 stars,   2 Comments )
Question  
Subject: Law, Illinois and Texas, Civil Suits, Plaintif Rights
Category: Business and Money
Asked by: jack1425-ga
List Price: $100.00
Posted: 12 Oct 2002 10:03 PDT
Expires: 11 Nov 2002 09:03 PST
Question ID: 75745
In Illinos and or Texas, can a person "sell" his case (precieved
injury) to another whom could then fully act in the eys of the law "as
if the true and original plaintif" in persueing the case for
compensation?

Request for Question Clarification by expertlaw-ga on 12 Oct 2002 12:16 PDT
What type of case is involved? (e.g., fraud, defamation, personal
injury, medical malpractice, etc.)

Clarification of Question by jack1425-ga on 13 Oct 2002 20:31 PDT
Thanks for asking. 
Many lines of sewage, possible seperate cases, feed this cespool.  At
this time, I want to know whether claims for injuries, physical and
emotional, deliberately caused or as a result of people/corporations
agreeing to persue illegal goals by illegal means, can be seperated
and sold or transferred to others.  Fraud, Breach of Fiduciary Duties,
third party interferance with contracts, wrongful deaths, bribery,
purgery, forgery, tax evasion, conspiracy, child abuse, money
launderring, insider-trading, murder, and more seem present.  Probably
could find medical malpractice too, thoughts?

Request for Question Clarification by expertlaw-ga on 16 Oct 2002 17:04 PDT
Dear jack1425,

You mention the following causes of action:

1. Personal Injury (injuries, physical and emotional)
2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (injuries ... emotional)
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (injuries ...
emotional, deliberately caused)
4. Battery (injuries ... physical ... deliberately caused)
5. Fraud
6. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
7. Tortious Interference with Contract
8. Wrongful Death
9. Securities Fraud (insider trading)
10. Medical malpractice


You also mention the following criminal acts, which do not of
themselves create separate civil causes of action:
A. Bribery
B. Perjury
C. Forgery (Although forgery could support an action for fraud by
somebody who received forged documents or currency).
D. Tax Evasion
E. Conspiracy (This charge is always brought in association with the
act the conspirators intended to commit. e.g., "Conspiracy to commit
homicide").
F. Child Abuse (Although acts of child abuse would likely support an
action for battery).
G. Murder (Although an act of murder would support an action for
wrongful death.)


Is that first list (numbers 1 through 10) what you want analyzed?

Thank you.

Clarification of Question by jack1425-ga on 17 Oct 2002 13:59 PDT
Yes, the first list represents the effects of the second so it those
of the first I am refferring to for clarification if they, as couses
of action, could be assigned, sold, and so forth to another.  Thanks
Answer  
Subject: Re: Law, Illinois and Texas, Civil Suits, Plaintif Rights
Answered By: richard-ga on 06 Nov 2002 15:52 PST
Rated:5 out of 5 stars
 
Hello and thank you for your question.

Unfortunately all of the misconduct that you describe in your answer
clarification is tortious conduct, and Illinois and Texas, and all the
50 states for that matter, prohibit the assignment of torts.

Here is an excerpt from an article that describes the benefits of
allowing torts to be assigned, while acknowledging that the law does
not permit it:
"[L]etting tort victims sell their claims to others would spread the
costs of accidents and the risks of recovery onto those most able and
willing to bear them. And because this cost-spreading can occur after
an accident, a tort claims market would address some of the problems
posed by underinsurance and noninsurance.

"[But a] defect of the current tort system is that it prohibits the
free exchange of ... tort claims."
Peter Charles Choharis, Creating a Market for Tort Claims
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg18v4c.html

The law of Illinois and Texas follows this common law rule:

Champerty occurs when one undertakes to carry on a litigation to which
he is not a party, in exchange for a share of the proceeds of the
litigation.  In a recent case, a company called Interclaim tried to
obtain names and contact details of victims "who may be willing to
cooperate with Interclaim towards effecting a global recovery of
assets currently under the control of Mr. Down (or his related
entities and/or associates)….[M]y primary objective is to make contact
with victims who may be willing to sell, at face value, their claim
against Mr. Blair Down and his corporate structure. The acquisition
of, say, two or more such claims would provide us with the requisite
legal platform from which to launch our plan of multi-jurisdictional
claim enforcement and recovery.”  This conduct ultimately led to
dismissal of the suit, because such claims cannot be assigned.
Anatomy of a Madison County (Illinois) Class Action: A Study of
Pathology
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cjr_6.htm


In Texas an attorney is prohibited from acquiring a proprietary
interest in the subject matter of litigation.  Although the common law
rule against 'champerty' has been modified to allow for contingent fee
arrangements, you generally cannot 'sell' your claims to an attorney
in whole or part, just as you cannot sell or assign them to a third
party.
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct Comments
http://www.michaelariens.com/profresp/txdrpccommentsframe.htm
[use the *find* function to find the word 'champerty' on this page]

Here's an article that summarizes the public policy logic that
prohibits assignment of tort claims:
VENTURE CAPITALISM FOR LAWSUITS? (PART TWO): Why Champerty Still
Matters
http://216.239.33.100/search?q=cache:3aJBSHrRxh0C:writ.corporate.findlaw.com/sebok/20010226.html+champerty+illinois+tort+assign&hl=en&ie=UTF-8
[Google cache]

Search terms used:
assign tort "common law"
champerty Illinois tort assign
champerty Texas

I hope you find this information useful, even if it is not the answer
that you'd hoped to receive.

Sincerely,
richard-ga

Request for Answer Clarification by jack1425-ga on 08 Nov 2002 21:12 PST
richard, thanks. Would your restrictions apply to seperate injured
parties forming a company that sold piblic shares but retained control
by at least 51%?
And would not a fee split of 99 to one allow for the transfer of the
claim in fact if not the actual liablity?
Your researching for tips now, as I'm locked out from adding to payout
at this point.

Clarification of Answer by richard-ga on 09 Nov 2002 06:17 PST
Hello again:

The nearest to what you describe in your clarification request is a
class action suit, in which people with a common grievance band
together.  A representative member of the class becomes the named or
lead plaintiff in the case, and in the usual case the entire class is
represented by one law firm.

So a member of the class does not need to pay the law firm (whose fees
are paid at the end of the case from the funds available for
settlement in an amount approved by the judge, and they are usually
big fees because the law firm gets compensated on a scale consistent
with having represented all the members of the class).  But a member
of the class also has little or no opportunity to consult with the law
firm, and has little or no say in how the case is handled, tried or
settled.  At the outset of the case an effort is made to inform people
who share the grievance [say all customers of the Bank who paid for
trust services within a given span of years] that the class action is
being brought, and unless individuals *opt out* of the case, they are
automatically drawn into it.

But returning to the question raised in your Clarification request,
the seperate injured parties could not form a company or sell public
shares in their claim even if they retained control by whatever
percentage for the reason given in my original answer: The common law
and the law of the 50 states prohibit on public policy grounds (the
public policy in question being the bar on vexatious litigation)
litigation on behalf of an enterprise whose membership (to any degree)
includes non-aggrieved individuals.

This would be so regardless of the fee-splitting arrangement.

I hope you find this additional material useful.

Sincerely,
richard-ga

Clarification of Answer by richard-ga on 09 Nov 2002 06:20 PST
"Seperate" should be "Separate." Sorry.

-R

Clarification of Answer by richard-ga on 09 Nov 2002 10:30 PST
Further to your question:

Researcher expertlaw-ga has suggested that I reconsider whether the
ban on assignment of tort claims is as broad as my answer indicates. 
He points out, correctly, that if a person dies from a tortious
injury, his cause of action can be maintained by his heirs.
Assignability of Claim in Tort for Damage to Personal Property, 57
A.L.R.2d 603, 605 (1958)
[no web link is available]

He also mentions finding a Texas case where that state's Supreme Court
refused to address a defendant's claim that the assignment of a
medical malpractice action violated public policy.

But in my view that's still that's a limited exception--an overriding
public policy that a wrongdoer should not escape civil liability if
his intentional or careless acts lead to the death or perhaps mere
injury of the victim.

But this motivated me to look some more at your original question. 
Having done so, I still feel that you will not be able to assign your
claims in the manner described.
LAWSUIT ABUSE AND JUDICIAL REFO
http://www.tppf.org/lawsuit/lawsuit.html

Finally, in my latest searches, I came upon an update to a treatise
that may hold the definitive answer to your question.
Texas Causes of Action
http://www.jonesmcclure.com/updates/coa/coa_update.pdf

If you have access to a library that has the main volume, it should be
worth a look.

Thanks again, and thanks to expertlaw-ga for his input.

-R

Request for Answer Clarification by jack1425-ga on 10 Nov 2002 13:21 PST
Nice follow-up, Richard.  The original question was posed cause ran
acoss fellow that was in business of showing "lay people" how to
purchase claims from others so I'm reluctant to go with your answer. 
What could he have been doing that I'm not asking (not required)?
I'm unsure whether you answerred the portion of clarification " could
one set contingent fees so high, 99%, that attorney would seemingly
possess the claim (requested)?
Thanks to Expertlaw also.

Clarification of Answer by richard-ga on 10 Nov 2002 23:05 PST
OK, let's see if as expertlaw suggests we can wrap up this question.

Contingent Fee
In the 99% figure in your earlier clarification request, I hadn't
realized you were referring to a contingent fee arrangement.  The
answer is that whether the contingent arrangement is 33% or 99% (and
in most states there's a legal ceiling on how big the fee can be
anyway) the attorney for the most part is not permitted to advance
money to his client in advance of a settlement or other disposition of
the case. So you couldn't use the contingent fee as a disguised sale
of the claim.
  

Illinois
Expertlaw's recent comment describes a case called Kleinwort Benson
North America v Quantum Financial Services,in which there was the
assignment of an action for fraud.  But look who the original
plaintiff (Quantum) assigned its claim to: "the former shareholders of
Quantum."  I assume your question is premised on an would-be
assignment to an unrelated third party, i.e. someone with no sort of
privity (as the law calls it) to the case.

So as to Illinois law, my answer stands.
 
Texas 
Here expertlaw cites an unpublished case, Gray v Estell, which is not
available to me.  However, I think we can be guided by the premise
that Texas courts may invalidate assignments on the basis of public
policy considerations, which is exactly what I concluded in my answer.
 
As for Mallios v Baker, 11 S.W.3d 157; 43 Tex. Sup. J.
254 (1998), you can read the decision in full at
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/texasstatecases/sc/980408o.htm 

In the last full paragraph of the decision, the Court cites two
earlier cases in which a person who accepted an assignment of a claim
was barred from taking anything.  The instant case was a question of
summary judgment-the Court holds that instead of granting summary
judgment, the trial court should go ahead and have a trial to
determine whether this assignment was void.  The Court states: "We . .
. express no opinion on the validity of the underlying arrangement
between Baker and Herron," so I don't think we should take this as an
indication that a claim of the sort you describe in your question is
assignable under Texas law.
 
Finally, in your clarification request you mention a fellow that was
in business of showing "lay people" how to purchase claims from
others.  I suspect that what he is talking about is purchasing
judgments rather than claims.  In other words, somebody has won a case
and has a money judgment, but the losing party still won't pay. 
There's no public party against in effect assigning the claim for
money, the way you would to a collection agency, so that would be OK. 
If he really is talking about buying the right to sue somebody, I
think he's off base.

That I think wraps it up.  I hope you have found this give-and-take
worthwhile, and thank you again for your question.

Regards,
Richard-ga
jack1425-ga rated this answer:5 out of 5 stars and gave an additional tip of: $50.00
Richard,thanks for giving me some latitude in my follow-ups.  Hope you
can help me in future also.

Comments  
Subject: Re: Law, Illinois and Texas, Civil Suits, Plaintif Rights
From: expertlaw-ga on 10 Nov 2002 22:11 PST
 
I hope that the following comments help focus the issues, so as to
help you guys wrap up this question. I'll apologize in advance for not
getting into the "corporate" issue raised in the first request for
clarification.


I. Illinois

The general rule for the assignment of actions in Illinois is set
forth in Kleinwort Benson North America v Quantum Financial Services,
181 Ill. 2d 214; 692 N.E.2d 269 (1998) (citations omitted):

-------------------------------------
At common law, many actions were neither assignable nor survived the
death of a claimant. Eventually, however, the law in this area changed
and provided that certain actions would survive the death of a
claimant and pass to the claimant's estate. ... In turn, the personal
representatives of a decedent were essentially perceived as assignees
of the decedent's property. ... Thus, historically, survivability and
assignability were treated similarly because, in both instances, a
claim was being transferred from one entity to another. Based on this
historical development, in determining assignability, this court has
considered whether the action would survive the death of the owner.
-------------------------------------

That particular case involved the assignment of an action for fraud.
The defendant argued that, while an assigned fraud claim could support
an award of actual damages, a punitive damages claim would not have
survived the death of the claimant and thus would not be assignable.
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed: "We hold that the former
shareholders of Quantum may properly seek punitive damages after
Quantum's assignment of the fraud claim to them."

Note that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to be deceased for the
plaintiff to assign the claim. If the cause of action would survive
the plaintiff's death, the cause of action would ordinarily be
assignable even if the plaintiff remains alive. (The type of cause of
action that usually survives a plaintiff are typically business or
economic torts, as opposed to personal injury (not resulting in
death). I did not delve enough into Illinois law to find where its
boundaries lie.


II. Texas

The general rule regarding assignment of causes of action in Texas is
set forth in Gray v Estell, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 1887 (2001)
(Unpublished) (citations omitted):

-------------------------------------

The general rule in Texas is that causes of action, including personal
injury actions, are assignable absent a statutory bar. ... The
assignee may maintain the suit in the assignor's name. ... The
assignee may recover either in his own name or in that of the
assignor. ...

However, the Texas Supreme Court and this Court have held some
assignments invalid despite the language of section 12.014 indicating
all causes of action are assignable. ... Texas courts may invalidate
assignments on the basis of public policy considerations.

-------------------------------------

Thus, as Texas does not follow the typical common law restrictions on
assignment of claims, it is necessary to research specific causes of
action in relation to public policy. It may be possible to find these
answers in a legal encyclopedia; otherwise, case law research must be
done on each cause of action.

The case alluded to above, regarding an attempt to assign a
malpractice case, is Mallios v Baker, 11 S.W.3d 157; 43 Tex. Sup. J.
254 (1998). "Mallios propounded only the second theory -- that Baker's
legal malpractice claim is barred because he purportedly assigned it
to Herron and that such an assignment contravenes public policy. But
even assuming Mallios is correct that the agreement between Baker and
Herron violates Texas public policy, an issue we do not decide today,
the question remains whether that invalidity would entitle Mallios to
a take-nothing judgment on Baker's malpractice claim."


III. "Class Actions"

A class action normally arises where a law firm, on behalf of a
plaintiff or group of plaintiffs, proposes to a court that it certify
a class of plaintiffs who have suffered similar injury from the same
set of events. If a class is certified, typically most members of the
class only then find out about the litigation, as they are given
notice of the action and their rights.

It is possible for a law firm to prosecute an action even on behalf of
multiple plaintiffs - even a large group of plaintiffs - while
representing those plaintiffs in their individual capacity. If this is
done, there is no necessity to get a class certified by the court, and
the action does not take the form of a "class action".


IV. "Contingent Fees"

Some states have hard caps on contingent fees. Michigan, for example,
caps contingent fees at 1/3 of the total recovered in a cause of
action. There are some states which have no limit other than
"reasonableness", although typically in those states contingent fees
stop at around 50%. Research of the ethical rules of Texas and
Illinois should reveal the limits on contingent fees for those states,
although in fairness to richard I think that researching those limits
would fall outside the scope of the original question.
Subject: Re: Law, Illinois and Texas, Civil Suits, Plaintif Rights
From: expertlaw-ga on 11 Nov 2002 10:49 PST
 
I am pleased to see that you are satisfied with the answer provided.
Nonetheless, please consider having your question reviewed by lawyers
in Illinois and Texas, as opinions are likely to vary.

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