Dear patrice29,
The names of the detectives who testified the alleged confession
statements of Jeffrey Deskovic were David Levine and Tom McIntyre.
Also involved was a polygrapher named Daniel Stephens.
Their names are mentioned in a court memorandum concerning an appeal
by Deskovic in February 1994 (source quoted in full below the answer):
"At the pretrial Huntley hearing, Detectives David Levine and Tom
McIntyre testified regarding numerous statements made by the defendant
to police officers on December 12, 1989, and January 9, 10, 22, 23,
and 24, 1990. (...) Nor is there any indication in the record that the
defendant's extensive statements on January 25, 1990, to polygrapher
Daniel Stephens and Detective McIntyre were precipitated by a coercive
environment or police misconduct 'that could induce a false
confession' (...) Moreover, because the defendant had put in issue the
voluntariness of his statements to Stephens, as well as his
post-polygraph confession to Detective McIntyre, the entire interview
between himself and these officers, with the exception of the results
of the polygraph examination, was properly admitted into evidence with
appropriate limiting instructions."
Hope this answers your question!
Regards,
Scriptor
==== Following the full court document ====
607 N.Y.S.2d 957
201 A.D.2d 579
The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent,
v.
Jeffrey DESKOVIC, Appellant.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Second Department.
Feb. 14, 1994.
Ethel P. Ross, Rye, for appellant.
Jeanine Pirro, Dist. Atty., White Plains (Steven A. Bender and
Richard E. Weill, of counsel), for respondent.
Before MANGANO, J.P., and BALLETTA, FRIEDMANN and FLORIO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court,
Westchester County (Colabella, J.), rendered January 18, 1991,
convicting him of murder in the second degree (two counts), rape in
the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth
degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings
up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the
defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress certain statements
made by him to the police.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1989, the defendant struck
the victim over the head with a blunt object, and dragged her into a
wooded area, where he beat, raped and strangled her.
At the pretrial Huntley hearing, Detectives David Levine and
Tom McIntyre testified regarding numerous statements made by the
defendant to police officers on December 12, 1989, and January 9, 10,
22, 23, and 24, 1990. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we
agree that the statements were properly admitted into evidence,
because in all of the interviews except the first, when the defendant
was clearly not a suspect, the defendant approached the police on his
own initiative and volunteered to help them in their investigation. In
this endeavor, he supplied the officers with the notes of his own
"investigation", drew an accurate diagram of the murder scene, visited
the park with police, discussed with them at length his own "theories"
of how the crimes occurred, turned over a key he "found", and supplied
a sample of his own blood. In addition, he was on several occasions
advised of his Miranda rights (see, People v. Starks, 139 A.D.2d 681,
527 N.Y.S.2d 358; People v. Crosby, 91 A.D.2d 20, 457 N.Y.S.2d 831).
Far from being in custody, coerced, or in any way restrained, the
defendant came and went at will.
Nor is there any indication in the record that the defendant's
extensive statements on January 25, 1990, to polygrapher Daniel
Stephens and Detective McIntyre were precipitated by a coercive
environment or police misconduct "that could induce a false
confession" or that was in any other respect "so fundamentally unfair
as to deny due process" (People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1, 11, 427
N.Y.S.2d 944, 405 N.E.2d 188; CPL 60.45[2][b]; see also, People v.
Riggins, 161 A.D.2d 813, 556 N.Y.S.2d 141; People v. Glasper, 160
A.D.2d 723, 553 N.Y.S.2d 472; People v. Melendez, 149 A.D.2d 918, 540
N.Y.S.2d 51; People v. Dyla, 142 A.D.2d 423, 443, 536 N.Y.S.2d 799;
People v. Madison, 135 A.D.2d 655, 657, 522 N.Y.S.2d 230, affd 73
N.Y.2d 810, 537 N.Y.S.2d 111, 534 N.E.2d 28; People v. Henry, 132
A.D.2d 673, 518 N.Y.S.2d 44). The hearing record [201 A.D.2d 580]
establishes that the defendant freely consented to take the polygraph
examination conducted by Investigator Stephens, and that he was
repeatedly advised of his prerogative to not take it, to discontinue
it, and to leave if he chose, or to answer only the questions he
wanted to answer. He was several times reminded of his Miranda rights,
which he repeatedly waived; he was not told that the machine was
"infallible"; and he was informed that the results of the test were
not admissible in a court of law unless he consented. Moreover, the
questioning regarding the murder was not continuous, the interview
itself was interrupted frequently, and much of it was devoted to
reiterating the defendant's rights, explaining the polygraph
procedures, obtaining the defendant's "background" information, and
establishing the defendant's physiological baselines. Finally, there
was no police deception or improper use of the polygraph (cf., People
v. Leonard, 59 A.D.2d 1, 397 N.Y.S.2d 386).
Moreover, because the defendant had put in issue the
voluntariness of his statements to Stephens, as well as his
post-polygraph confession to Detective McIntyre, the entire interview
between himself and these officers, with the exception of the results
of the polygraph examination, was properly admitted into evidence with
appropriate limiting instructions.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People
(see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d
932; People v. Kennedy, 47 N.Y.2d 196, 417 N.Y.S.2d 452, 391 N.E.2d
288; People v. Calabro, 157 A.D.2d 736, 550 N.Y.S.2d 32), we find that
it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of the
crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. There was overwhelming
evidence of the defendant's guilt in the form of the defendant's own
multiple inculpatory statements, as corroborated by such physical
evidence as the victim's autopsy findings (see, CPL 60.50; People v.
Lipsky, 57 N.Y.2d 560, 571, 457 N.Y.S.2d 451, 443 N.E.2d 925; People
v. Hamilton, 121 A.D.2d 395, 503 N.Y.S.2d 106). Moreover, upon the
exercise of our factual review power, we find that the verdict was not
against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15[5].
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and
find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without
merit.
Search terms used:
Jeffrey Deskovic
http://news.google.com/archivesearch?q=Jeffrey+Deskovic&btnG=Search+Archives&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8
Sources:
FindLaw Case Search
http://www.findlaw.com/casecode/
Fastcase
https://www.fastcase.com/Google/Start.aspx?C=e3ad52668525196e351f1442b00dc35bc28c51ad5b43456e&D=24c238c516ca978af319975e2c9b32403578cc72c844e870 |
